Abstract. In this paper we exploit the notions of conjoined and iterated conditionals, which are defined in the setting of coherence by means of suitable conditional random quantities with values in the interval [0, 1]. We examine the iterated conditional (B|K)|(A|H), by showing that A|H p-entails B|K if and only if (B|K)|(A|H) = 1. Then, we show that a p-consistent family F = {E1|H1, E2|H2} p-entails a conditional event E3|H3 if and only if E3|H3 = 1, or (E3|H3)|QC(S) = 1 for some nonempty subset S of F, where QC(S) is the quasi conjunction of the conditional events in S. Then, we examine the inference rules And, Cut, Cautious Monotonicity, and Or of System P and other well known inference rules (Modus Ponens, Modus Tollens, Bayes). We also show that QC(F)|C(F) = 1, where C(F) is the conjunction of the conditional events in F. We characterize p-entailment by showing that F p-entails E3|H3 if and only if (E3|H3)|C(F) = 1. Finally, we examine Denial of the antecedent and Affirmation of the consequent, where the p-entailment of (E3|H3) from F does not hold, by showing that (E3|H3)|C(F) = 1.
Introduction
The new paradigm psychology of reasoning is characterized by using probability theory instead of classical bivalent logic as a normative background theory (see, e.g., Gilio & Over, 2012; Oaksford & Chater, 2007; Over, 2009; Elqayam & Over, 2012; Pfeifer & Douven, 2014; Pfeifer, 2013; Politzer & Baratgin, 2015) . One of the key topics of the new paradigm psychology of reasoning is how people interpret and reason about conditionals (see, e.g., Douven, 2016; Edgington, 1995; Politzer, Over, & Baratgin, 2010; Evans & Over, 2004; Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2005 Pfeifer & Tulkki, 2017; Oaksford & Chater, 2003; Over & Cruz, 2018) . How people interpret and reason about conditionals was also one of the key topics in the (old) logic-based paradigm psychology of reasoning, which dominated the 20 th century experimental psychology of reasoning. While human interpretation of conditionals was labeled as "irrational" or "defective", since the participants' responses deviated from the semantics of the material conditional, rationality was revisited and rehabilitated within the new probabilistic paradigm: specifically, the majority of participants -treat negated antecedents as irrelevant for evaluating whether a conditional holds, and -evaluate their degrees of belief in conditionals by respective conditional probabilities (and not by the probability of the material conditional).
These findings speak for the conditional event interpretation, and against the material conditional interpretation, of conditionals. Among various interpretations of probability, we advocate and use the coherence-based approach to probability (see, e.g., Berti, Miranda, & Rigo, 2017; Biazzo & Gilio, 2000; Biazzo, Gilio, Lukasiewicz, & Sanfilippo, 2005; Capotorti, Lad, & Sanfilippo, 2007; Coletti & Scozzafava, 2002; Coletti, Petturiti, & Vantaggi, 2016; Gilio, Pfeifer, & Sanfilippo, 2016; Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2013c , 2013d Sanfilippo, 2012; Walley, Pelessoni, & Vicig, 2004) , which traces back to Bruno de Finetti (1937 /1980 , 1970 /1974 . From a psychological point of view, it is evident that probability serves to measure degrees of belief and not some objective quantity in the world: this is in line with de Finetti provocative ontological motto "Probability does not exist " (1970 ( /1974 . The probabilistic approach based on coherence is thus characterized by subjective, and not by objective, probabilities. Methodologically, the approach based on coherence principle differs in many respects to standard approaches to probabilities. We mention two of them which highlight the psychological plausibility of our approach.
First, contrary to many approaches to probability, the coherence-based approach does not require a complete algebra. For drawing a probabilistic modus ponens inference, for example, an algebra could be constructed from the constituents derived from the involved events in the inference rule. This is psychologically plausible, as the reasoning person may focus on only what is considered to be relevant for drawing the inference.
Second, conditional probability is a primitive notion and it is not defined by the fraction of the joint and the marginal probabilities: the standard definition of P (C|A) by P (A∧C) P (A) requires to assume that P (A) > 0, as a fraction over zero is undefined. Probabilistic approaches which define conditional probabilities in this way can therefore not properly manage zero antecedent probabilities. The subjective probabilistic approach allows for managing zero antecedent probabilities; moreover, zero probabilities are even exploited for reducing the complexity of the probabilistic inference. Another aspect of defining conditional probability directly is that the degree of belief in a conditional If A, then C can be given in a direct way by the reasoner without presupposing knowledge about P (A ∧ C) and P (A): even as in everyday life it may be impracticable to evaluate the latter two probabilities, people do assess conditionals. For example, if we want to assess our degree of belief in the conditional that If I take the train at six, I am at home at seven, we can do that directly, without thinking first about the unconditional probabilities of I take the train at six and I am at home at seven and of I take the train at six.
In some recent papers of Gilio and Sanfilippo the notions of conjoined and iterated conditionals have been introduced as suitable conditional random quantities (Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2013a , 2013b , 2017a . These new objects extend the usual notions of conjunction and conditioning from the case of unconditional events to the case of conditional events. For instance, we developed a semantics for examples like the following (which was presented by Douven, 2016, p. 45): (I) If the mother is angry if the son gets a B, then she will be furious if the son gets a C, which is an iterated (or nested) conditional. It consists of a conditional in its antecedent (A) if the son gets a B, then the mother is angry, and a conditonal in its consequent (C) if the son gets a C, then the mother is furious.
Of course, the degree of belief in (I) cannot be something like a conditional probability, as the famous triviality results by Lewis (1976) have shown. Rather, we conceive iterated conditonals like (I) as conditional random quantities (and not as conditonal events) and measure the degree of belief in such objects by previsions P (not by probabilities P ; Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2014; Gilio, Over, Pfeifer, & Sanfilippo, 2017; Sanfilippo, Pfeifer, Over, & Gilio, 2018) . We will explain the formal details below. Interestingly, when we considered the uncertainty propagation rule for the generalized probabilistic modus ponens , where the degree of beliefs are propagated, for instance, from "The cup broke if dropped" (A|H), and "if the cup broke if dropped, then the cup was fragile (C|(A|H))" to "the cup was fragile (C)", we observed, that the uncertainty propagation rules coincide with those of the non-iterated probabilistic modus ponens (i.e., from P (A) = x and P (C|A) = y infer xy ≤ P (C) ≤ xy + 1 − x). Likewise, we have shown that the uncertainty propagation rules of the iterated version of Centering coincide with the respective (non-iterated) probability propagation rules (Sanfilippo et al., 2018) . Thus, a remarkable aspect of the definitions of nested conditionals in terms of conditonal random quantities preserve some well known classical results.
The main result of this paper may be also related to an analogue result derived from the deduction theorem. This theorem implies that if an argument is logically valid (or if the premises logically entail the conclusion), then the argument can be transformed into a logically true conditional, s.t., the premises are combined by conjunction and form the antecedent and the conclusion forms the consequent of the resulting condtional, which is then a tautology. For example, the logically valid modus ponens (where A → C denotes the material conditional A ∨ C and |= denotes logical entailment),
can be transformed by the deduction theorem into the following conditional, which is a tautology (and vice versa), that is:
Instead of logical entailment, however, we consider in this paper the probabilistic entailment (p-entailment), as introduced by Adams (1975 Adams ( , 1998 . Let C(F ) denote the conjunction of the conditional events in a p-consistent family F . We study, in analogy to the deduction theorem, whether the claim "a conditional event E|H is p-entailed by a p-consistent family F of conditional events" is equivalent to the claim "the prevision in the iterated conditional (E|H)|C(F ) is equal to 1". We examine many cases related to this aspect; in particular, we examine some inference rules of System P and other well known inference rules.
We remark that this basic relation, between p-entailment and iterated conditioning, appears in its most elementary form when we consider two not impossible events A and B in the case where A ⊆ B, that is where A ∧ B = ∅. In this case P (A) ≤ P (B) and then A p-entails B, that is P (A) = 1 implies P (B) = 1, and the unique coherent assessment on B|A is P (B|A) = 1. Therefore, by recalling that in the framework of the betting scheme, when we pay P (B|A) = x, we receive B|A = AB + xA; when A ⊆ B, it holds that A p-entails B and B|A = AB + 1 · A = A + A = 1. Conversely, if B|A = 1, then P (B|A) = 1; moreover, P (B) = P (B|A)P (A) + P (B|A)P (A) = P (A) + P (B|A)P (A) , and when P (A) = 1 it follows that P (B) = 1, so that A p-entails B.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we give some preliminaries on the notions of coherence and p-entailment for conditional random quantities, which assume values in [0, 1] . In Section 3, after recalling the notions of conjoined and iterated conditionals, we show that a conditional event A|H p-entails another conditional event B|K if and only if (B|K)|(A|H) = 1. Moreover, we show that a p-consistent family of two conditional events {E 1 |H 1 , E 2 |H 2 } p-entails a conditional event E 3 |H 3 if and only if it holds that (E 3 |H 3 )|QC(E 1 |H 1 , E 2 |H 2 ) = 1, where QC(E 1 |H 1 , E 2 |H 2 ) denotes the quasi conjunction of E 1 |H 1 , E 2 |H 2 . We also characterize p-entailment of E 3 |H 3 from the family {E 1 |H 1 , E 2 |H 2 } by the property that E 3 |H 3 = 1, or (E 3 |H 3 )|QC(S) = 1 for some nonempty S ⊆ {E 1 |H 1 , E 2 |H 2 }. In Section 4 we suitably generalize the notion of iterated conditioning; then, we examine some inference rules of System P and other well known inference rules. The generalization of the notion of iterated conditioning is necessary in order to examine the OR rule. In Section 5 we give two results which relate p-entailment and iterated conditioning. The first result shows that the iterated conditional having as antecedent and consequent the conjunction and the quasi conjunction of two conditional events, respectively, is equal to 1. The second result characterizes the p-entailment of the conditional event E 3 |H 3 from a p-consistent family {E 1 |H 1 , E 2 |H 2 } by the property that the iterated conditional (E 3 |H 3 )|((E 1 |H 1 ) ∧ (E 2 |H 2 )) is equal to 1. Finally, we examine two examples where the p-entailment of the conditional event E 3 |H 3 from a p-consistent family {E 1 |H 1 , E 2 |H 2 } does not hold. We also show that in these cases that (E 3 |H 3 )|((E 1 |H 1 ) ∧ (E 2 |H 2 )) does not coincide with 1.
Preliminaries
In our approach events represent uncertain facts described by (non ambiguous) logical propositions. An event A is a two-valued logical entity which is either true (T ), or false (F ). The indicator of an event A is a two-valued numerical quantity which is 1, or 0, according to whether A is true, or false, respectively. We use the same symbol to refer to an event and its indicator. We denote by Ω the sure event and by ∅ the impossible one (notice that, when necessary, the symbol ∅ will denote the empty set). Given two events A and B, we denote by A ∧ B, or simply by AB, the intersection, or conjunction, of A and B, as defined in propositional logic; likewise, we denote by A ∨ B the union, or disjunction, of A and B. We denote by A the negation of A. Of course, the truth values for conjunctions, disjunctions and negations are defined as usual. Given any events A and B, we simply write A ⊆ B to denote that A logically implies B, that is AB = ∅, which means that it is necessary that A and B cannot both be true. Given two events A, H, with H = ∅, the conditional event A|H is defined as a three-valued logical entity which is true (T), or false (F), or void (V), according to whether AH is true, or AH is true, or H is true, respectively. Given a conditional event A|H with P (A|H) = x, then for (the indicator of) A|H we have A|H = AH + xH ∈ {1, 0, x} (Sanfilippo et al., 2018, Appendix A.3) . We recall below the notion of logical implication of Goodman and Nguyen (1988) for conditional events (see also Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2013d) . Definition 1. Given two conditional events A|H and B|K we define that A|H logically implies B|K (denoted by A|H ⊆ B|K) if and only if AH is true implies BK is true and BK is true implies AH is true; i.e., AH ⊆ BK and BK ⊆ AH.
A generalization of the Goodman and Nguyen logical implication to conditional random quantities has been given by (Pelessoni & Vicig, 2014) . The notions of p-consistency and p-entailment of Adams (1975) were formulated for conditional events in the setting of coherence by Gilio and Sanfilippo (2010) (see also Gilio, 2012; Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2011 , 2013c .
. . , n} be a family of n conditional events. Then, F n is p-consistent if and only if the probability assessment (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ) = (1, 1, . . . , 1) on F n is coherent.
Definition 3. A p-consistent family F n = {E i |H i , i = 1, . . . , n} p-entails a conditional event E|H (denoted by F n |= p E|H) if and only if for any coherent probability assessment (p 1 , . . . , p n , z) on F n ∪ {E|H} it holds that: if p 1 = · · · = p n = 1, then z = 1.
Of course, when F n p-entails E|H, there may be coherent assessments (p 1 , . . . , p n , z) with z = 1, but in such cases p i = 1 for at least one index i. We say that the inference from a p-consistent family F n to E|H is p-valid if and only if F n p-entails E|H. We recall the well known notion of quasi conjunction among conditional events:
Definition 4. Given a family F n = {E i |H i , i = 1, . . . , n} of n conditional events, the quasi conjunction of the conditional events in F n is defined as
Moreover, we recall the following characterization of p-entailment (Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2013c) :
. . , E n |H n } and a conditional event E|H be given. The following assertions are equivalent:
. . , n, P (E|H) = 0, is not coherent; 4. Either there exists a nonempty S ⊆ F n such that QC(S) implies E|H, or H ⊆ E; 5. There exists a nonempty S ⊆ F n such that QC(S) p-entails E|H.
We also recall the characterization of the p-entailment for two conditional events (Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2013d , Theorem 7): Theorem 2. Given two conditional events A|H, B|K, with AH = ∅. It holds that
where Π is the set of coherent assessments (x, y) on {A|H, B|K}.
We denote by X a random quantity, that is an uncertain real quantity, which has a well determined but unknown value. We assume that X has a finite set of possible values. Given any event H = ∅, agreeing to the betting metaphor, if you assess that the prevision of "X conditional on H" (or short: "X given H"), P(X|H), is equal to µ, this means that for any given real number s you are willing to pay an amount µs and to receive sX, or µs, according to whether H is true, or false (i.e., when the bet is called off), respectively. In particular, when X is (the indicator of) an event A, then P(X|H) = P (A|H). In Gilio and Sanfilippo (2014) the notions of conjoined, disjoined, and iterated conditionals have been studied in the framework of conditional random quantities. In particular, the next result establishes some conditions under which two conditional random quantities X|H and Y |K coincide (Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2014 , Theorem 4):
Theorem 3. Given any events H = ∅ and K = ∅, and any random quantities X and Y , let Π be the set of the coherent prevision assessments P(X|H) = µ and P(Y |K) = ν.
(i) Assume that, for every (µ, ν) ∈ Π, the values of X|H and Y |K always coincide when H ∨ K is true; then µ = ν for every (µ, ν) ∈ Π.
(ii) For every (µ, ν) ∈ Π, the values of X|H and Y |K always coincide when H ∨ K is true if and only if X|H = Y |K.
Generalized System P and Compound Conditionals
In this section we recall the notions of conjunction and iterated conditioning. Then, we show that A|H p-entails B|K if and only if (B|K)|(A|H) = 1. Moreover, we show that
Exploring conjunction and iterated conditioning
We recall below the definition of conjuntion of two conditional events A|H and B|K (Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2013b , 2013a . Different approaches to compounded conditionals, not based on coherence, have been developed by other authors (see, e.g., Kaufmann, 2009; McGee, 1989) .
Definition 5. Given any pair of conditional events A|H and B|K, with P (A|H) = x and P (B|K) = y, we define their conjunction as the conditional random quantity (A|H) ∧ (B|K) = Z | (H ∨ K), where Z = min {A|H, B|K}.
In betting terms, z = P[(A|H) ∧ (B|K)] represents the amount you agree to pay, with the proviso that you will receive the quantity:
From (1), it follows that the conjunction (A|H) ∧ (B|K) is the following random quantity
We observe that if H = K, then HBK = AHK = ∅, so that (A|H) ∧ (B|K) = ABH + zH; moreover, AB|H = ABH + pH, where p = P (AB|H). We notice that (A|H) ∧ (B|H) and AB|H coincide when H is true; then, by Theorem 3, z = p; thus,
We recall that, given any coherent assessment (x, y) on {A|H, B|K}, with A, H, B, K logically independent, and with H = ∅, K = ∅, the extension z = P[(A|H) ∧ (B|K)] is coherent if and only if the following Fréchet-Hoeffding bounds are satisfied (Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2014 , Theorem 7):
Note that the bounds in (4) coincide with the bounds for the conjunction of unconditional probabilities (i.e., if P (A) = x and P (B) = y, then max{x + y − 1, 0} ≤ P (AB) ≤ min{x, y}).
We now turn to recalling and discussing the notion of iterated conditioning (see, e.g., (Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2013a , 2013b ).
Definition 6 (Iterated conditioning). Given any pair of conditional events A|H and B|K, with AH = ∅, the iterated conditional (B|K)|(A|H) is defined as the conditional random quantity
where
Remark 1. Notice that we assumed that AH = ∅ to give a nontrivial meaning to the notion of the iterated conditional. Indeed, if AH were equal to ∅, that is A|H = 0, then it would be the case that A|H = 1 and (B|K)|(A|H) = (B|K)|0 = (B|K)∧(A|H)+µA|H = µ would follow; that is, (B|K)|(A|H) would coincide with the (indeterminate) value µ. Similarly in the case of B|∅ (which is of no interest): the trivial iterated conditional (B|K)|0 is not considered in our approach.
We observe that, by linearity of prevision, it holds that
from which it follows that z = µx. Here, when x > 0, we obtain µ = z x ∈ [0, 1]. Notice that z + µ(1 − x), i.e. µ, is the value of (B|K)|(A|H) when HK is true. Then, by observing that
In particular, when x = 0, it holds that
As we can see, in order that the prevision assessment µ on (B|K)|(A|H) be coherent, µ must belong to the convex hull of the values 0, y, 1; that is, (also when x = 0) it must be that µ ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 1. Given two conditional events A|H and B|K, it holds that
Proof. We set P (A|H) = x, P (B|K) = y, and P[(A|H) ∧ (B|K)] = z. As A|H ⊆ B|K, it holds that AHBK = AHK = HBK = ∅ and AHBK = AH (Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2013d, Remark 3) . Then,
Moreover, A|H = AH + xH = AH + xHBK + xHK.
We notice that (A|H) ∧ (B|K) and A|H coincide when H ∨ K is true. Then, z = x follows from Theorem 3. Therefore, (A|H) ∧ (B|K) = A|H.
⊓ ⊔
The following theorem shows that a conditional A|H p-entails another conditional B|K if and only if the unique coherent prevision assessment for the corresponding iterated conditonal (B|K)|(A|H) is equal to one.
Theorem 4. Given two (p-consistent) conditional events A|H and B|K, it holds that, A|H ⇒ p B|K ⇐⇒ (B|K)|(A|H) = 1.
Proof. (⇒). We distinguish two cases: (i) A|H ⊆ B|K; (ii) K ⊆ B. Case (i). We remark that if A|H ⊆ B|K, then A|H ≤ B|K and P (A|H) ≤ P (B|K); moreover, (A|H) ∧ (B|K) = A|H. Then, by defining P((B|K)|(A|H)) = µ, P (A|H) = x, we obtain
By linearity of prevision, we obtain
which implies that
In order for µ to be coherent, µ must belong to the convex hull of the set {1}; i.e. µ = 1. In other words, given two conditional events A|H and B|K, with A|H ⊆ B|K, it holds that: P((B|K)|(A|H)) = 1. Thus (B|K)|(A|H) = 1. Case (ii). If K ⊆ B it holds that P (B|K) = y = 1 and B|K = 1. Then, Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2013a, Remark 4) . Moreover, (B|K)|(A|H) = A|H + µA|H and by linearity of prevision it holds that µ = x + µ(1 − x). Then,
Then, by coherence, µ = 1 and (B|K)|(A|H) = 1. Thus, p-entailment of B|K from A|H implies (B|K)|(A|H) = 1. (⇐). Assume that (B|K)|(A|H) = 1, so that the unique coherent assessment for P[(B|K)|(A|H)] is µ = 1. Then, by observing that P[(A|H) ∧ (B|K)] ≤ P (B|K) = y, it follows that
Then, when x = 1, it holds that y = 1; that is, A|H p-entails B|K.
⊓ ⊔ Corollary 1. Let three conditional events E 1 |H 1 , E 2 |H 2 , and E 3 |H 3 be given, where
Proof. The assertion directly follows by applying Theorem 4, with A|H = QC(E 1 |H 1 , E 2 |H 2 ) and B|K = E 3 |H 3 . ⊓ ⊔
In the next result we characterize the p-entailment of E 3 |H 3 from the family {E 1 |H 1 , E 2 |H 2 } by the property that E 3 |H 3 = 1, or (E 3 |H 3 )|QC(S) = 1 for some nonempty S ⊆ {E 1 |H 1 , E 2 |H 2 }.
Theorem 5. Let three conditional events E 1 |H 1 , E 2 |H 2 , and E 3 |H 3 be given, where {E 1 |H 1 , E 2 |H 2 } is p-consistent. Then, the family {E 1 |H 1 , E 2 |H 2 } pentails E 3 |H 3 if and only if at least one of the following conditions is satisfied:
Proof. (⇒). By Theorem 1, as
. If E 3 |H 3 = 1 then the unique coherent assessment on E 3 |H 3 is P (E 3 |H 3 ) = 1. This means that H 3 ⊆ E 3 and then 
Iterated conditionals and some inference rules
In this section we examine some inference rules with {E 1 |H 1 , E 2 |H 2 } as the premise set, and E 3 |H 3 as the conclusion, by showing that, if
The notion of conjunction of three conditional events is given below (Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2017a ).
Definition 7. Given a family of three conditional events
is defined as the conditional random quantity
We recall below the definition of the object (E 3 |H 3 )|((E 1 |H 1 ) ∧ (E 2 |H 2 )), which is under study in (Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2017b) .
Definition 8. Let be given three conditional events E 1 |H 1 , E 2 |H 2 , and E 3 |H 3 , with (E 1 |H 1 ) ∧ (E 2 |H 2 ) = 0. We denote by (E 3 |H 3 )|((E 1 |H 1 ) ∧ (E 2 |H 2 )) the conditional random quantity
Remark 2. We observe that, defining P[(E 1 |H 1 ) ∧ (E 2 |H 2 ) ∧ (E 3 |H 3 )] = t and P[(E 1 |H 1 ) ∧ (E 2 |H 2 )] = z, by the linearity of prevision it holds that µ = t + µ(1 − z); then, t = µz, that is
Modus Ponens: {C|A, A} ⇒ p C. It holds that (C|A) ∧ A = AC = QC(AC); then, by Theorem 4, as AC ⊆ C it follows that
This can be seen as an analogy to the fact that the modus ponens is logically valid in logic and that the probabilistic modus ponens is p-valid.
Modus Tollens: {C|A, C} ⇒ p A. It holds that (C|A) ∧ C = xAC, where x = P (C|A), while QC(C|A, C) = AC; then, assuming x > 0, we obtain
By coherence it must be the case that µ = x + µ(1 − x), i.e., x = µx, which implies µ = x + µ(1 − x) = 1; therefore,
This can be seen as an analogy to the fact that the modus tollens is logically valid in logic and that the probabilistic modus tollens is p-valid. Notice that, if x = 0, then ((C|A) ∧ C) = 0 and the object A|((C|A) ∧ C) = A|0 = µ, which is indeterminate (see Remark 1).
Bayes. We note that (E|AH) ∧ (H|A) = EH|A = QC(E|AH, H|A); then, as EH|A ⊆ H|EA, by Theorem (2) it holds that {E|AH, H|A} ⇒ p H|EA. Moreover, by Theorem 4, it follows that In particular, if A = Ω, we obtain (H|E)|(EH) = 1.
And, Cut, and Cautious Monotonicity of System P
In this section we consider the following inference rules of System P (Kraus, Lehmann, & Magidor, 1990) : And, Cut, and Cautious Monotonicity (short: CM). System P is a basic nonmonotonic reasoning which allows for retracting conclusions in the light of new premises. The probabilistic versions of the rules of System P are p-valid (Adams, 1975; Biazzo, Gilio, Lukasiewicz, & Sanfilippo, 2002; Gilio, 2002) . Experimental evidence supports the psychological plausibility of System P (see, e.g. Da Silva Neves, Bonnefon, & Raufaste, 2002; Pfeifer & Kleiter, 2003 , 2005 Schurz, 2005) . 
Or rule of System P
We recall that the Or rule is p-valid, that is {C|A, C|B} ⇒ p C|(A∨B). The next result shows that the conclusion of the Or rule, C|(A ∨ B), given the conjunction of the premises, (C|A) ∧ (C|B), coincides with 1.
Theorem 6. Given a p-consistent family {C|A, C|B} it holds that (C|(A ∨ B)|((C|A) ∧ (C|B)) = 1.
Proof. By Definition 8, we obtain (C|(A∨B))|((C|A)∧(C|B)) = (C|(A∨B))∧(C|A)∧(C|B)+µ[1−(C|A)∧(C|B)] ,
where µ = P[(C|(A ∨ B))|(C|A) ∧ (C|B)]. We set P (C|A) = x, P (C|B) = y, and P((C|A) ∧ (C|B)) = z; then,
As we can see, (C|(A ∨ B)) ∧ (C|A) ∧ (C|B) and (C|A) ∧ (C|B) coincide when A ∨ B is true; then, by Theorem 3 it holds that t = z, so that (10) and by the linearity of prevision we obtain µ = z + µ(1 − z), so that z = µz. Moreover, by (10) we obtain
if AB is true, which reduces to
if ABC ∨ C is true.
In order to prove that (C|(A ∨ B))|((C|A) ∧ (C|B)) = 1, we distinguish the following cases:
Case (a). By recalling that z = µz, as z > 0 it follows that µ = 1; then,
Then, by coherence, µ = 1 and (C|(A ∨ B))|((C|A) ∧ (C|B)) = 1. Case (b). As x = y = 0, it holds that
and, by coherence, µ = 1; thus, (C|(A ∨ B))|((C|A) ∧ (C|B)) = 1. Case (c). By coherence, µ is a linear convex combination of the values 1, y + µ(1 − y), and x + µ(1 − x), that is,
with λ h ≥ 0, h = 1, 2, 3, and λ 1 + λ 2 + λ 3 = 1. The equation (11) can be written as µ(λ 1 + λ 2 y + λ 3 x) = λ 1 + λ 2 y + λ 3 x , where λ 1 + λ 2 y + λ 3 x > 0; then µ = y + µ(1 − y) = x + µ(1 − x) = 1 and (C|(A ∨ B))|((C|A) ∧ (C|B)) = 1. Case (d). As y = 0 it holds that y + µ(1 − y) = µ; then,
if BC is true.
By coherence, µ is a linear convex combination of the values 1,
The equation (12) can be written as µ(λ 1 + λ 2 x) = λ 1 + λ 2 x, where
Case (e). Since x = 0, it holds that x + µ(1 − x) = µ; then,
if AC is true.
The equation (13) can be written as µ(λ 1 + λ 2 y) = λ 1 + λ 2 y, where λ 1 + λ 2 y > 0; then, µ = y + µ(1 − y) = 1 and (C|(A ∨ B))|((C|A) ∧ (C|B)) = 1. ⊓ ⊔ Remark 3. We observe that
Then, the statement of Theorem 6 amounts to say that the iterated conditional QC(C|A, C|B)|((C|A) ∧ (C|B)) is equal to 1. This aspect will be analyzed in general in the next section.
Iterated conditionals and p-entailment
In this section we give two results which relate p-entailment and iterated conditioning. In the next result, by defining
, we show that, under pconsistency of F , the iterated conditional QC(F )|(C(F )) is equal to 1.
Proof. We set
Moreover, we set P[QC(F )|C(F )] = µ. Then,
It can be verified that the possible values of the random vector (C(F ),
The value (x 12 , η) is associated to the constituent H 1 H 2 . As we can see, conditionally on H 1 ∨ H 2 being true, C(F ) and C(F ) ∧ QC(F ) coincide; then, by Theorem 3, x 12 = η, so that QC(F ) = C(F ). Then,
By the linearity of prevision, we obtain µ = x 12 + µ(1 − x 12 ), that is x 12 = µx 12 . Then,
We distinguish the following cases:
is the amount to be paid in order to receive 1, or µ, according to whether the event (C(F ) = 1) is true, or false, respectively. Then, by coherence, it must be the case that µ = 1. Therefore, QC(F )|C(F ) = 1. Case (b). By coherence, µ must be a linear convex combination of the values 1, x 1 + µ(1 − x 1 ), and x 2 + µ(1 − x 2 ), that is,
with λ h ≥ 0, h = 1, 2, 3, and λ 1 + λ 2 + λ 3 = 1. The equation (14) can be written as
where λ 1 + λ 2 x 1 + λ 3 x 2 > 0; then, µ = x 1 + µ(1 − x 1 ) = x 2 + µ(1 − x 2 ) = 1 and QC(F )|C(F ) = 1. Case (c). As x 1 = 0, it holds that x 1 + µ(1 − x 1 ) = µ, so that
Then, by coherence, µ must be a linear convex combination of the values 1,
It follows that µ(λ 1 + λ 2 x 2 ) = λ 1 + λ 2 x 2 , with λ 1 + λ 2 x 2 > 0. Then, µ = 1 and QC(F )|C(F ) = 1. Case (d). As x 2 = 0, it holds that x 2 + µ(1 − x 2 ) = µ, so that QC(F )|C(F ) ∈ {1, x 1 +µ(1−x 1 ), µ}. Then, by coherence, µ must be a linear convex combination of the values 1,
It follows that µ(λ 1 + λ 2 x 1 ) = λ 1 + λ 2 x 1 , with λ 1 + λ 2 x 1 > 0. Then, µ = 1 and QC(F )|C(F ) = 1. Therefore, from the p-consistency of the family F it follows that QC(F )|C(F ) = 1.
⊓ ⊔
The next theorem shows that the p-entailment of a conditional event E 3 |H 3 from a p-consistent family {E 1 |H 1 , E 2 |H 2 } is equivalent to the iterated conditional (E 3 |H 3 )|((E 1 |H 1 ) ∧ (E 2 |H 2 )) being equal to 1. Theorem 8. Let three conditional events E 1 |H 1 , E 2 |H 2 , and E 3 |H 3 be given, where
Proof. (⇒). We observe that by p-consistency E 1 H 1 E 2 H 2 = ∅ and then (E 1 |H 1 ) ∧ (E 2 |H 2 ) = 0. By Theorem 1, {E 1 |H 1 , E 2 |H 2 } p-entails E 3 |H 3 if and only if it holds that QC(S) ⊆ E 3 |H 3 for some ∅ = S ⊆ {E 1 |H 1 , E 2 |H 2 }, or H 3 ⊆ E 3 . We observe that, when H 3 E 3 , it holds that S = {E 1 |H 1 }, or S = {E 2 |H 2 }, or S = {E 1 |H 1 , E 2 |H 2 }. We show that the iterated conditional may be represented as
We distinguish the following four cases:
Then, as x 3 = 1, we obtain x 13 = x 1 , x 23 = x 2 ; it follows that for the random vector (( (15) is satisfied. Case (iii). As E 2 |H 2 ⊆ E 3 |H 3 , by Proposition 1 it holds that E 2 |H 2 ∧ E 3 |H 3 = E 2 |H 2 and ( (15) is satisfied. Case (iv). By taking into account that QC(E 1 |H 1 , E 2 |H 2 ) ⊆ E 3 |H 3 , the set of possible values of the random vector
as shown in Table 1 , is
As we can see, conditionally on H 1 ∨ H 2 ∨ H 3 being true (i.e., H 1 H 2 H 3 being false), (E 1 |H 1 ) ∧ (E 2 |H 2 ) and (E 1 |H 1 ) ∧ (E 2 |H 2 ) ∧ (E 3 |H 3 ) coincide; then, by Theorem 3 it holds that x 12 = x 123 , so that (15) is satisfied. Now, by using the representation (15), for the iterated conditional we obtain
(16) Moreover, by the linearity of prevision it holds that Table 1 . Possible values of the random vector ((E1|H1)∧(E2|H2), QC(E1|H1, E2|H2), (E1|H1)∧(E2|H2)∧(E3|H3)), under the assumption that QC(E1|H1, E2|H2) ⊆ E3|H3.
from which it follows that x 12 = µx 12 . Then, (16) becomes
In order to prove that (E 3 |H 3 )|((E 1 |H 1 ) ∧ (E 2 |H 2 )) = 1, as already done in the proof of Theorem 6, we distinguish the following cases: (a) x 12 > 0; (b)
Case (a). As x 12 > 0 and x 12 = µx 12 , it follows that µ = 1 and then
, µ}. We observe that, based on the metaphor of the betting scheme,
is the amount to be paid in order to receive 1, or µ, according to whether E 1 H 1 E 2 H 2 is true, or false, respectively. Then, by discarding the case where it is received back what has been paid, coherence requires that µ = 1. Therefore (E 3 |H 3 )|((E 1 |H 1 )∧(E 2 |H 2 )) = 1. Case (c). By coherence, µ must be a linear convex combination of the values 1, x 1 + µ(1 − x 1 ), and x 2 + µ(1 − x 2 ), that is,
with λ h ≥ 0, h = 1, 2, 3, and λ 1 + λ 2 + λ 3 = 1. The equation (18) can be written as
It follows that µ(λ 1 + λ 2 x 1 ) = λ 1 + λ 2 x 1 , with λ 1 + λ 2 x 1 > 0. Then, µ = 1 and
Case (e). As x 1 = 0, it holds that
It follows that µ(λ 1 + λ 2 x 2 ) = λ 1 + λ 2 x 2 , with λ 1 + λ 2 x 2 > 0. Then, µ = 1 and
|H 2 )) = 1, so that the unique coherent prevision assessment on (E 3 |H 3 )|((E 1 |H 1 ) ∧ (E 2 |H 2 )) is µ = 1. From Remark 2 it holds that x 123 = µx 12 = x 12 . Moreover, x 123 ≤ x 3 (Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2017a, Equation (8) ) and x 12 ≥ max{x 1 + x 2 − 1, 0} (see Equation (4)). Then, it holds that max{x 1 + x 2 − 1, 0} ≤ x 12 = x 123 ≤ x 3 , and, when x 1 = x 2 = 1, it follows that x 12 = x 123 = x 3 = 1. Therefore,
Remark 4. We recall that {E 1 |H 1 , E 2 |H 2 } p-entails QC(E 1 |H 1 , E 2 |H 2 ) (QAND rule, see, e.g., Gilio & Sanfilippo, 2011 , 2013c . Then, Theorem 7 follows by applying Theorem 8 with E 3 |H 3 = QC(E 1 |H 1 , E 2 |H 2 ). Similar comments can be made for the inference rules examined in Section 4.
In the examples below we show that if
) does not coincide with 1.
Example 1 (Denial of the antecedent). We consider the rule where the premise set is {A, C|A} and the conclusion is C. As is well known, that Denial of the antecedent is neither logically valid in logic nor p-valid in probability logic. Indeed, by defining P (A) = x, P (C|A) = y, P (C) = z, it holds that
Then, when x = y = 1, we obtain z = 1 − P ( Example 2 (Affirmation of the consequent). We consider the rule where the premise set is {C, C|A} and the conclusion is A. Affirmation of the consequent is neither logically valid in logic nor p-valid in probability logic. Indeed, by defining P (C) = x, P (C|A) = y, P (A) = z, and P (C|A) = t, it holds that P (C) = x = P (C|A)P (A) + P (C|A)P (A) = yz + t(1 − z).
Then, when x = y = 1, we obtain 1 = z + t − zt, that is z(1 − t) = (1 − t). Therefore, when t < 1, it follows that z = 1. In other words, by adding the premise P (C|A) < 1 (i.e. what we introduced as a negated default in Gilio et al., 2016) , it holds that P (C) = 1, P (C|A) = 1, P (C|A) < 1 ⇒ P (A) = 1.
But in general (where no assumptions are made about P (C|A)), z ∈ [0, 1]; thus p-entailment of A from {C, C|A} does not hold. Then, by Theorem 8, the iterated conditional A|(C ∧ (C|A)) does not coincide with 1. Indeed, by defining P[A|(C ∧ (C|A))] = µ, it holds that with µ being coherent, for every µ ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, A|(C ∧ (C|A)) = 1.
As another example, we could consider Transitivity, where {C|B, B|A} is the premise set and C|A is the conclusion. The p-entailment does not hold, indeed the assessment (1, 1, z) on {C|B, B|A, C|A} is coherent for any z ∈ [0, 1]. Then, by Theorem 8, the iterated conditional (C|A)|(C|B) ∧ (B|A) does not coincide with 1. But, by adding the negated default P (A|(A ∨ B)) < 1 it holds that (Gilio et al., 2016, Theorem 5) P (C|B) = 1, P (B|A) = 1, P (A|(A ∨ B)) < 1 ⇒ P (C|A) = 1.
Concluding remarks
The results of this paper are based on the notions of conjoined conditionals and iterated conditionals. These objects, introduced in recent papers by Gilio and Sanfilippo, are defined in the setting of coherence by means of suitable conditional random quantities with values in the interval [0, 1] . By exploiting the logical implication of Goodman and Nguyen, we have shown that A|H pentails B|K if and only if (B|K)|(A|H) = 1. Moreover, we have shown that a p-consistent family F = {E 1 |H 1 , E 2 |H 2 } p-entails a conditional event E 3 |H 3 if and only if E 3 |H 3 = 1, or (E 3 |H 3 )|QC(S) = 1 for some nonempty subset S of F .
We have also applied our result considered the inference rules And, Cut, Cautious Monotonicity, and Or of System P and the inference rules Modus Ponens, Modus Tollens, and Bayes. We have also shown that the iterated conditional QC(F )|C(F ) is equal to 1 for every p-consistent family F = {E 1 |H 1 , E 2 |H 2 }. Then, we have characterized the p-entailment of E 3 |H 3 from a p-consistent family F by showing that it amounts to the condition (E 3 |H 3 )|C(F ) = 1. Finally, we examined two examples (Denial of the Antecedent and Affirmation of the Consequent) when the p-entailment of the conditional event E 3 |H 3 from a p-consistent family {E 1 |H 1 , E 2 |H 2 } does not hold by also showing that (E 3 |H 3 )|((E 1 |H 1 ) ∧ (E 2 |H 2 )) = 1. Concerning the Affirmation of the Consequent, we also showed that (a kind of conditional) p-entailment holds if we add a suitable negated default in the set of premises. Psychologically, this could serve as a new explanation why some people interpret Affirmation of the Consequent as a valid argument form. Indeed, this argument form plays an important rôle in abductive reasoning in philosophy of science (e.g., where conclusions about possible causes/diseases are derived from effects/symptoms). Future work is needed to explore such applications of the presented theory and to explore further formal desiderata also related to the deduction theorem.
